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Abstract
The paper analyses the birth of the encryption software industry (ESI), a new niche in the software industry. Using a
Chandlerian perspective, this work reports the main facts about fir entry and growth, with a particular focus on start-up
strategies and actions.
Since scale economies do not play a major role in ESI, the paper investigates the different sources of fir competitive
advantages.
This work shows that innovation and product differentiation, along with investments in co-specialised assets, are variables
strongly correlated to young fir probability to survive and grow. In doing so, we have collected highly detailed information
on product introduction, US patents granted, worldwide alliances and biographical data of fir founders.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction1
How do new industries emerge? What are the main
drivers of fir entry and growth? Where do the actual
market leaders come from?
These “Big-Bang” questions are usually unan-
swered in the literature, mainly because it is daring to
collect reliable data of earlier industry stages. Even
if Alfred Chandler’s works have proved that these is-
sues are fundamental, far too few are the studies that
∗ Tel.: +34-919249608; fax: +34-916249607.
E-mail address marco.giarratana@uc3m.es (M.S. Giarratana).
1 The usual disclaims apply.
investigate the birth of industries. Moreover, the rich-
ness of information that can be collected in the firs
stages of an industry goes well beyond conventional
wisdom of management and industrial studies.
Opening the black-box of the initial industry his-
tory is the main goal of this paper, which describes
with massive empirical evidence all the main features
and actors of a new market from its very beginnings.
This will allow us to draw original insights on com-
petition forces and strategic directions of a specifi
industry in which innovation, entrepreneurship and
fir growth strategies are strictly interrelated. More-
over, what distinguishes this study from a classical
Chandlerian industry study is the focus on a highly
0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.01.001
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skill-based industry. In this sense, exploitation of scale
economies does not play a major role and firm have
to fin different sources of competitive advantages.
Particularly, this paper studies the birth and devel-
opment of the encryption software industry (ESI), a
market niche in the software industry. In ESI new
start-ups were able to dominate the market, exploiting
firs business opportunities and previous technological
breakthroughs of large incumbents. As a consequence,
we will see that the history of this industry can mainly
be described by small start-ups dynamics.
In so doing, we follow a common trend in the
standard literature on small businesses (Churchill and
Lewis, 1983; Kazanjian, 1988; Mitra and Pingali,
1999) and separate our analysis in two main sections.
First we study the entry process and then we follow
the leading start-ups along their path of growth. In
fact, several contributions on this topic (Olson, 1987;
Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Zacharakis et al., 1999)
have long stressed that the capabilities that allow firm
to survive in the firs place are completely different
from those yielding fir growth. This makes essential
the paper division in two parts in order to provide
the most appropriate and valuable comprehension on
what drives fir entry and what drives fir growth.
After a brief data description, the paper illus-
trates the patterns of fir entry with a deep anal-
ysis of the industry environment, the products and
the entrepreneurs (Section 3). Section 4 highlights
the drivers of fir post-entry growth, according
to the rate of product differentiation, investments
in co-specialised assets and geographic expansion.
Section 5 concludes and summarises the main find
ings.
2. Description of data sources
In this section, we provide an ex-ante, detailed de-
scription of the data we used, since we triangulate in
the paper a wide range of data from different sources.
• Firm entry was assigned when a new ESI product
was released on the market. Products introduction
data were taken from Infotrac’s General Business
File ASAP database, downloading all the press arti-
cles that report a “Product announcement”, a “New
software release” and a “Software evaluation” in the
security software sector. From this source we could
extract the name of the company, the exact date of
product introduction and the precise SIC code of
the product.
• Information about alliances was drawn from
Infotrac’s Insite Promt database that, from a large
set of trade journals, magazines and other spe-
cialised press, reports several categories of fir
agreements like strategic alliances, licences, and
product contracts. For the period 1993–1999 we
downloaded all the events classifie under the SIC
Code 73726 (Encryption Software Sector). With
these data, we created a value-added database (we
refer to it as the EVENT database) reclassifying
data and introducing some new information like the
passive or active fir role (acquirer or acquired,
licensee or licenser, etc.) and the presence of a tech-
nological content in the agreement. We re-grouped
the events in fi e broad categories: (i) techno-
logical alliances; (ii) distribution and marketing
alliances; (iii) technological licences; (iv) product
order contracts; and (v) mergers and acquisitions.
• Patent data are downloaded from the US Patent Of-
fic web site. We considered all the patents granted
in the US class 380 (Cryptography) that include
“equipment and processes which: (a) conceal or
obscure intelligible information by transforming
such information so as to make the information
intelligible to a casual or unauthorised recipient;
or (b) extract intelligible information from such a
concealed representation, including breaking of un-
known codes and messages”.2 For each patent we
extracted all the information reported in the on-line
front page of the patent (issue date, assignee, cita-
tions and inventors).
• Firm’s financia data were taken from Hoover’s,
which collects data for the Security Software & Ser-
vices industry.
• Data on the structure of fir groups (including sub-
sidiaries) were taken from Business and Company
Resource Center database, Gale Group’s Infotrac.
• Information on fir profile and histories, on bi-
ographical data of firm founders and managers
were taken from Hoover’s, Mergent-on-Line and
Infotrac’s ASAP3 database.
2 US Patent Offic classificatio manual, http://www.uspto.gov.
3 For more details see the several notes in the text that cite the
journal articles.
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We also conduct fi e interviews with managers of
leading start-ups, precisely at Checkpoint, Baltimore,
Aladdin and Network Associates.
3. Entry process in ESI
This section will show how the birth of ESI is
mainly explained by start-up dynamics. Therefore, de-
scribing entry in ESI, we follow the approach of Gart-
ner (Gartner, 1985), who proposed a useful framework
to study new venture creation. The author highlighted
three main field of analysis: the environment, the
new product (or process), and the entrepreneurs. At
this point of analysis, fir organisational characteris-
tics could safely remain in the background; since they
could often be seen as a combination of the firs three
features (see Baron and Hanna, 2002). Consequently,
the opening paragraph focuses on the environment.
3.1. The environment
Several researchers (Audretsch, 1991; Klepper,
1996; Shane, 2001) have confirme the importance
of technological regimes in influencin the dynamics
of entry. Especially in the fiel of entrepreneurship
studies, we agree with Bhide (p. 31) that “start-ups
can more easily turn a profi in some field then in
others” (Bhide, 2000). First of all, the software indus-
try is generally characterised by low entry barriers.
Moreover, the industry underwent a process of market
segmentation and fir specialisation that spurred the
birth of several market niches and new firm (Torrisi,
1998). Given these features, the software industry
appeared as a turbulent industry with a high rate of
entry, exit, product innovation and imitation, where
the low entry and exit barriers spurred fir birth and
death more dynamically compared to other industries.
In this sense, the software industry could represent
the ideal environment to study and understand the
birth of new market niches.
The early stages of ESI date back to the mid-1970s
and the beginning of the 1980s, when the US Govern-
ment finance military projects linked strictly to the
security of data transmission. Large ICT firm awarded
these types of contracts and worked actively on soft-
ware security architectures. At this stage, university
departments, especially from Stanford and MIT, and
government agencies also played a major role. Some
firms such as Philips, NEC and Pioneer, were also in-
volved in the design of the bulk of firs cable TV sets,
which included the encryption and the decryption of
cable signals through TV decoders. This is also evi-
dent from data in Table 1 where the most cited4 or-
ganisations that were granted a US patent in the 380
USPTO class in the period 1977–1992 were listed. We
will discuss below the importance of patents in this
USPTO class.
Lately, after more than 15 years, the huge develop-
ment of Personal Computer market and Internet, espe-
cially Internet financia transactions, introduced new
consumers and market needs that have spurred the pro-
liferation of innovative products in the industry.5 Data
provided by the International Data Corporation6 eval-
uated the world market of ESI 2.17 billion dollars in
1997 and 3.2 billion dollars in 1998, with an estimate
of 4.4 billion dollars for the 1999.
Fig. 1 shows the Hazard and Survivor functions
calculated on the sample firm that entered the ESI
market from 1989.7 The Hazard rate represents the
percentage of exit among firm at risk of exit, while
the Survivor rate is the percentage of survived firm
(see Kiefer, 1988). The negative duration dependence
of ESI data is a common findin in young industries
with a massive fl w of entry.
Fig. 1 does not show any sound firs mover advan-
tage effect or any shakeout process in ESI. This is a
quite sound proof that economies of scale in this in-
dustry do not play any significan role, given the low
fi ed costs needed to start an ESI venture. For exam-
ple, the initial amount invested to set up Check Point
Software, the fourth largest fir in ESI at 1998, was
US$ 300,000.8
The rising civilian demand increased the spectrum
and the complexity of different products and services
offered. Due to these changing conditions, young
4 Backward citations from 1993–1999 sample patents.
5 Rising E-commerce will drive Growth for Security Software
Companies, Business Week, 7th April 2000, p. 6.
6 “Worldwide Internet Security Software Market to close in on
4.4 billion dollars in 1999”, 1999. EDP Weekly’s IT Monitor
40(32), 18.
7 We defin an exit when a fir does not release any new
product or new version of existing product after 2 years from the
introduction of last product.
8 “Israel’s Safety Net”, 1999. Electronic Business 25(5), 72.
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Table 1
Most cited assignees, granted patents 1977–1992
Firm Sector Citations (C) Patents (P) C/P ratio
IBM Computer 528 46 11.47
Motorota Telecom 226 24 9.41
Scientifi Atlanta Telecom 202 18 11.22
Pitney Bowes Computer 165 16 10.31
Qualcomm Electronics 97 3 32.33
AT&T Telecom 97 8 12.12
Pioneer Electronics 95 9 10.55
Philips Electronics 95 7 13.57
Aisin Seiki Cars 83 6 13.83
Stanford University University 80 2 40
M.I.T. University 75 2 37.5
NEC Electronics 72 6 12
General Instrument Electronics 68 8 8.5
NCR Computer 63 5 12.6
Hitachi Electronics 62 4 15.5
VISA Services 53 2 26.5
Total 2061 166 17.34
Other 2520 224 11.81
Source US Patent Office
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Fig. 1. Hazard and survivor functions, 1989–2000.
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Table 2
World market leaders in ESI at 1998
Rank Firm Revenues (US$ in million) World market share Year of entry Firms in the same entry cohort
1 Network Ass. 990 0.171 1993 18
2 Symantec 578.4 0.099 1990 8
3 RSA Data Security 171.3 0.029 1991 17
4 Check Point 141.9 0.024 1995 35
5 Rainbow Tech. 109.2 0.018 1998 56
6 Axent Tech 101 0.017 1994 29
7 Trend Micro 86.2 0.014 1991 17
8 Secure Computing 61.4 0.010 1994 29
9 Entrust Tech. 49 0.008 1997 57
10 Cylink 42.8 0.007 1995 35
11 SystemSoft 42.6 0.007 1998 56
12 VeriSign 38.9 0.006 1998 56
13 BindView 38.5 0.006 1995 35
14 Aladdin 36.1 0.006 1997 57
15 Safenet 23.2 0.005 1998 56
Total 2487.3 0.429
Source IDC Corporation, Infotrac.
small ventures were better suited to exploit these op-
portunities. Table 2 shows the world market leaders
in ESI at 1998, 10 years after the f rst product was
introduced on the market. It is worth noticing that all
these f rms were start-ups in ESI. As in other indus-
tries (Henderson, 1993), ESI represents a classical
example where start-ups are the organisation forms
that better adapt to young turbulent environments.
As previously noted, this evidence leads us to focus
mainly on the role of start-ups in ESI, leaving the
study of incumbent strategies to further works.
The industry offers now a wide selection of prod-
ucts going from the basic products of encryption, such
as Firewall and Anti-virus programs to advanced se-
curity services like Public Key Infrastructures, Secu-
rity Certif cation and Virtual Private Network. Table 3
shows the most important product niches of ESI, ac-
Table 3
Product niches in ESI
Description SIC code
Authentication Digital Signature 7372663
Anti-virus 7372612
Data storage protection 7372691
Firewalls 7372681
Utility software 7372614
Network Software Security 7372611
Virtual private network access 7372613
Source Infotrac.
cording to SIC code division. Generally, these prod-
ucts are software packages strengthening boundaries
between networks and protecting computers against
viruses and unauthorised users. They also integrate at
the same time network access control, authentication,
security, and policy management. The product func-
tions aim not only to assure the secrecy and protection
of data and data transmission against possible privacy
attacks from outside, but also to provide verif cation
and testing of possible intrusions and sabotages from
inside.
The design of the general security protection of an
information system is now a complex project and it
incorporates problem solutions from different tech-
nological f elds such as mathematics, software, hard-
ware and network design. According to the CEO of a
provider of security software solutions: “security poli-
cies are hard to design, hard to update, hard to enforce,
and hard to make practical”.9
Besides the low initial sunk costs, ESI was also
characterised by initial low entry barriers from the
technological point of view; the breakthrough innova-
tions were protected by patents granted about twenty
years before the rise of the industry. New f rms could
easily and with no costs base their product architec-
tures upon those patents without paying any royalties.
9 Wilbanks, J., CEO of SecureWork. In: “Managing Managed
Security”, Information Security, January 2001, p. 12.
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Table 4
Citations and granted patents cited by “1993–1999” patents (back-
ward citations), 1976–1984
Year Citations (C) Patents (P) C/P ratio
1976 19 2 9.5
1977 194 7 27.71
1978 110 7 15.71
1979 50 5 10
1980 189 19 9.94
1981 167 14 11.92
1982 160 14 11.42
1983 165 12 13.75
1984 181 16 11.31
Average 137.22 10.66 13.47
Average 1985–1992 552.5 250.5 2.20
Source US Patent Off ce.
In Table 4, we include the number of patents cited by
all patents granted in the period 1993–1999 and their
number of citations; it is not diff cult to observe the
importance of the patents granted from 1976 to 1984
compared to the others (see C/P ratio).10 Furthermore,
the two most cited patents were granted by to public
institutions like MIT and the Stanford University.
The survival rate of f rms that entered the market
was low, especially in the f rst periods; the survival
post-entry average rate is 19% after a year and 10%
setting the 2000 as the f nal year. This evidence is
striking compared for example to data in manufactur-
ing industries (Dunne et al., 1988), where the survival
rate equals to 50.4% after 5 years and 13% after 15
years.
The high exit rate could be explained by two im-
portant factors: f rst by low exit barriers and secondly
by the uncertainty about the quality of the product. In
fact, only after a proved resistance against several at-
tacks, the product could be considered effective. This
implies that an initial, even casual, bad performance
of a new product could be fatal to the producer, even
if the product was substantially a good one (Smith,
1999).
Some concluding remarks: the process that spurred
the birth of the ESI was characterised by demand pull
conditions, but the particular technological core of the
10 It is worth noting that on average the patents cited in the period
1976–1992 are 19.03% of the total patents granted in those years
in the 380 class.
products and the presence of high skilled customers
generated selective selection phenomena, especially in
the earlier years, where only few new ventures were
able to survive. To have a better idea of the factors that
lie behind the survival capability of f rms, we need
now to describe the main features of ESI products.
3.2. The products: algorithms and software packages
Chrisman et al. (1998) pointed the ability of f rm
survival the effective measure of f tness in the con-
text of entry by new f rm formation. Along this view,
the common, and perhaps the only, aim of a new
venture in the f rst stages of its life is working as
a self-sustaining economic activity (Kazanjian, 1988;
Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Wagner, 1994). Given the
high rate of sudden f rm mortality after entry in ESI,
we consider essential studying the preliminary selec-
tion factors among f rms. In so doing, a “meticulous”
comprehension of what is an ESI product is required.
Among all the different technologies required
in a standard ESI product, the key feature is the
crypto-algorithm that specif es the mathematical
transformations that are performed on data. A crypto
algorithm is a procedure that takes the plain text
data and transforms it into cipher text. The process
could be reversed with a secret key. The right balance
between communication speed requirements and se-
curity protection is what assures the quality of the
product. In fact, the time consumed by encrypting and
decrypting processes depends on the length of math-
ematical algorithm and on the power of computing
machines (Smith, 1999).
The crypto algorithm is the principal object of a
f rm’s patent. This is mainly due to the recent trend
of US Patent Off ce to loosening restrictions that had
been placed upon patent applications directed to soft-
ware inventions. Contrary to the previous discipline,
mathematical algorithms could now be examined with
respect to their novelty, non-obviousness and utility
(Gosnell, 1999; Bessen and Hunt, 2003). Mathemati-
cal and software engineering capabilities represent in-
deed the core competences needed in the production of
ESI products. The USPTO 380 class, “Cryptography”,
is the strategic technological f eld for ESI. It could be
the case that some f rms were granted patents related
to these technological competencies in classes differ-
ent from the 380. Nevertheless, the class 380 accounts
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for the bulk of inventions in cryptography; it is worth
noting that all start-ups that dominate the sector (see
Table 2) have not been granted any patents outside this
class by 2000.
At the very beginning, small f rms entered spe-
cialised in a well-def ned product area like, for ex-
ample, Checkpoint and Axent in Firewall; Network
Associates, Symantec and Trendmicro in Anti-virus
software; Certicom, Entrust and Cyberguard in Vir-
tual Private Network architecture; Baltimore in digital
signature protocols. From interviews with start-up ex-
ecutives we conducted, it emerged clearly the impor-
tance for start-ups to build up reputation on a specif c
product. A manager of a f rm leader in ESI aff rmed:
“At the beginning, the great idea was to transform
a complex technological invention in a user friendly
product off-the-shelf. It should be easy to install and
use. Our f rm based its success creating the Firewall
as now we know it”. The origin of ESI was basically
a story of good innovations: a f rm survived if it intro-
duced a sound technological product. Consequently,
the major causes of a f rm’s survival (or mortality)
was the quality of the product, that is a combination
of mathematical algorithm, case sensitive intrusions
knowledge and software adaptability. For this reason,
the success means simply the ability to propose a
product with a sound mathematical core that adapts to
different software platforms and preserves the speed
of data transmission. In Box 1, we include three
examples of successful start-ups product introduction.
These three examples help understand two impor-
tant points: f rst, the importance of the quality of
innovation and of the technical capabilities of the
entrepreneur. Second, the important role of the patent
protection in this industry, since all these three math-
ematical algorithms are strongly protected by patents.
In fact, innovation and imitation have always repre-
sented essential strategic variables in the high-tech
industries and intellectual propriety rights play a key
part in protecting f rm competitive advantages (Arora
et al., 2001). Nonetheless, patents are usually not seen
as good instruments (Cohen et al., 2000) to protect
software innovations from imitation, and f rms had
often utilised other privacy techniques such as tacit-
ness and secrecy. However, we would like to stress
again that ESI represents a special case where patents
do protect against possible imitation, thanks to the
importance of mathematical algorithms.
Box 1. Start-ups and innovative products in ESI
• Checkpoint created an innovative process to
built f rewalls, security products that could go
directly off the shelf to a customer and that
enforce the boundaries between different net-
works and protect f rms against unauthorised
users. Checkpoint’s programmers introduced
a new language, Inspect, specif cally for di-
recting the rapid inspection of communication
packets and a compiler to translate policy rules
written in Inspect into assembly language.
The program opens data packets, checks the
content and quickly inspects each data packet.
The innovation is that the program sends along
the data in parcels after they are checked,
rather than waiting to reassemble them before
the entire transmission. This methodology
increased dramatically the speed of data trans-
mission, with the same level of security.11
• Geoffrey Rhoads, a physicist and founder of
Digimarc, created the core Digimarc tech-
nology when he was working on a camera
for cleaning up digital spaces images pho-
tographed through ground-based telescopes.
Rhoads reversed the imaging f ltering process
and added a micro ownership mark to the
photos. The technology could imperceptibly
include digital data in visual content (like
movies and photos) and valuable documents
such as f nancial data-sheets and passports. In
addition, Rhoads introduced a method that al-
lows the identif cation of a copy of an original
signal from the original signal. This can be
achieved by modulating the source code with
a small “noise” code that could be cancelled
in case of a copied product.12
11 “Safe at 100megabits/s. Check Point Software Technologies
creates Internet f rewall which supports high speed transactions”,
Forbes, 30 December 1996, p. 138. See also US Patent 5,835,726,
f led in 17th June 1996, by Shwed, G., et al., “System for secur-
ing the f ow of and selectively modifying packets in a computer
network”.
12 “Trolling the net. Digimarc’s watermarking technology”,
September 1998. Electric Bussiness 24(9), 60. US Patent
5,710,834, f led in 8th May 1995, by Rhoads, G., “Method and
apparatus responsive to a code signal conveyed through a graphic
image”.
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• Certicom’s Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a
technology especially useful in what is known
as “small-footprint environments” such as
smart cards or wireless communications de-
vices, where space is the scarcest resource. If
the standard string of computer bits necessary
to encode or decode an encrypted message
needs about 1,024 bits, Certicom’s system
accomplishes in 160. The difference is rooted
in mathematics.13 In fact while the standard
cryptographic systems are based on integer
calculus, the elliptic curve cryptosystem uses
equations that can be calculated more easily
and faster.14
In fact, the core of security products is the math-
ematical procedure that lies behind the encryption of
data. For example, Entrust Technologies, one of the
leading innovators in the f eld, is responsible for over
90 patents and pending patent applications.15
Given the importance of patents in protecting al-
gorithms, it could be useful to provide more specif c
information on what is the content of a typical patent
in 380 USPTO class. Ronald Rivest, a former re-
searcher at MIT, invented one of the most famous and
widespread crypto algorithms at the RSA Data Secu-
rity. This invention is protected by the USPTO patent
5,724,428, entitled “Block Encryption Algorithm
with Data-dependent Rotations”. This patent docu-
ment includes: four f ow charts reporting step-by-step
the encryption–decryption routines and the detailed
description of all the mathematical procedures that
perform the encryption. Moreover, there are also some
f nal considerations about how the length, in terms of
bits, of the secret key (the usual password) affects the
level of security and the speed of the cipher process.
Thus, patents protect mainly two separated things:
(1) the structure of the sequences of steps and rou-
tines of the encryption process; and (2) the mathemat-
13 A classical form of an elliptic curve is y2+xy = x3+ax2+b.
14 “Cheaper encryption tool gaining momentum. Certicom
Corp.’s elliptic curve cryptosystem”, American Banker, 2 April
1997, p. 12. US Patent number 6,141,420, f led January 29th 1997,
by S. Vanstone et al., “Elliptic curve encryption system”.
15 “Network Magazine Names Entrust/PKI(TM) Software 2001
Product of the Year”, Market News Publishing, 8 June 2001, p. 10.
ical procedures that lie behind them. Software code
is not mentioned in the patent document and so it
is not protected. The mathematical algorithm repre-
sents, therefore, a form of general-purpose technology
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), which could be
run and used on different software packages and ap-
plications (i.e. e-mail clients, compressing programs
and Internet browser).
Mostly thanks to this effective patent protection,
ESI market could be classif ed into two sub-markets:
(i) a market for the standard products of ESI (Fire-
wall, Anti-virus, etc.); and (ii) a market for technology,
where f rms could acquire the right to use the propri-
etary mathematical algorithm patented. Fig. 2 shows
a graphical representation of the two sub-markets. As
we can see, the mathematical algorithm could be used
in several in-house research projects or for the pro-
duction of third-party products.
In terms of market size, Hoovers data show that in
2000 for the top 15 start-ups in ESI (see Table 2) 56.6%
of revenues comes from sales of product software,
28,3% from services and 14,9% from licensing the
technological algorithm.
From our EVENT database, between 1993 and
1999, we collected 119 “Technological License
Agreements” and 143 “Product Order Contracts”.
Technological License Agreements include only con-
tracts where the object of transaction is the math-
ematical algorithm; while Product Order Contracts
represent the classical supply of off-the-shelf soft-
ware products among f rms (we excluded the business
to customer contracts).16 These two events could be
considered good proxies for the two types of markets.
The most important buyers and sellers, for number of
technological licenses and product contracts awarded,
are ranked in Table 5. We would like to stress that
Product Order Contracts and Technological Licenses
Agreements are usually not the two faces of the same
contract. On average, in the 92% of cases, for each
f rm, the product order contract is not included in the
technology licensing agreement.
Concerning the licenses, the most important seller
of technology, among 53 different sellers, is RSA Data
Security with 23 licensing contracts signed (19.3% of
total licenses concluded). Among 105 different f rms,
16 This distinction is fundamental to avoid confusion; in fact a
software product is often sold in term of number of licences.
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Fig. 2. The market for products and for technologies in ESI.
Table 5
Main buyers and sellers of products and technology in ESI,
1993–1999
Technology licenses
Rank Main licensors No. Main licensees No.
1 RSA Data Security 23 IBM 12
2 Certicom 13 H&P 8
3 Network Ass. 10 Time Warner 4
4 Entrust 5 Microsoft 3
5 Check Point 4 Compaq 4
6 Macrovision 4 NEC 3
7 VeriSign 4 Network Ass. 3
8 Diversinet 2 Lucent 3
9 Cylink 2 Rainbow Tech. 3
10 Finjan 2 Secured Comm. 2
Product order and contracts
Main sellers Main buyers
1 VeriSign 10 Verizon 6
2 RSA Data Security 8 IBM 5
3 Secure Computing 5 H&P 4
4 Check Point 4 Visa 4
5 Network Ass. 4 NSA 2
6 Cylink 4 Infonet 2
7 Entrust 4 KPMG 2
8 Cisco Systems 4 Microsoft 2
9 Axent 4 Time Warner 2
10 Baltimore Tech 4 Sun Microsystem 2
Source EVENT database.
the most important buyer of the technology is IBM
(8.3% of total contracts). These data show that leading
start-ups are dominating both the market for products
and the market for algorithms.
In most cases, a technology buyer utilises the crypto
algorithm in two ways: or to develop new proprietary
in-house innovation from the technology acquired or
to directly include the algorithm in an already existing
product. In Box 2, we present two standard examples
of Technological Licenses Agreements to explain the
nature of this agreement and to highlight the specif city
of this “market for algorithms” in ESI.
In conclusion, two factors were common among the
most successful f rms: the f rst is that they entered by
specialising in a particular niche. Secondly, success-
ful start-ups entered with a distinguished innovative
product. Interestingly, the empirical evidence seems
to conf rm a strong interdependency between the tech-
nological and the product sub-markets. The Pearson
correlation coeff cient between product orders and
technological licenses awarded by f rm and by year
equals 0.68, with a signif cance level of 5%. This high
correlation supports the thesis that, especially in the
f rst years of industry evolution, innovation played a
major role. A good mathematical algorithm that gives
f rm success in the market for technologies seems to
be a necessary condition for gaining a competitive
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Box 2. Technology licensing contracts and their
applications
• In-house development: In 1995 VLSI Technol-
ogy licensed RSA Data Security’s RC4 Sym-
metric StreamCipher encryption algorithm and
embedded it on its own processor and mem-
ory cores. VLSI aimed to combine its proces-
sor with RSA technology in order to sell an
innovative product to AT&T Bell Laboratories
for the production of a new data encryption
system.17
• Third-part products: In 1997, VeriFone ob-
tained the rights to use the “Elliptic Curve
Algorithms” for smart cards by licensing the
patent from Certicom. VeriFone will use the
technology for its Personal ATM and VeriS-
mart System devices for downloading money
into smart cards.18
advantage in the market for products. Moreover, the
fact that the same large ICT f rms are the major buy-
ers in the two sub-markets conf rms the importance of
the role played both by high skilled consumers and by
the quality of product innovation. The interaction be-
tween market focus and product innovation has been
already spotted in the literature (Vinnell and Hamilton,
1999) as one of the key factors of survival in the early
stages of a new business. Firm entry with an innova-
tive and sound idea in a particular product area could
create a strong reputation effect and sustain a com-
petitive advantage in the preliminary phases of com-
petition (Kazanjian and Rao, 1999). This means that
specialised entry it is not a suff cient condition to guar-
antee f rm survival, especially in high-tech sectors. It is
the quality of product technologies combined with the
business market focus that increase start-up reputation
and prof tability. The empirical evidence seems to con-
f rm this point. Among the 200 out-gone f rms in ESI
from 1989 to 2000 only 3.5% were granted a patent
at USPTO. Results do not change introducing the age
variable: comparing similar entry cohorts, among the
17 “VLSI to embed RSA encryption under license”, 16 January
1995. Electronic News 4(1), 60.
18 “VeriFone to license new encryption engine”, 30 June 1997.
PC Week 14(28), 53.
87 exit f rms that survived at least 4 years, only 5.7%
were grated a patent.19 On the other side, 73% of
survived f rms by 2000 with more than 4 years of the
presence on the market were at least assignees of a
patent.
3.3. The entrepreneurs
In the f rst periods of a new f rm life, the f rm and its
entrepreneur were often indistinguishable (Meyer and
Roberts, 1986; Terpstra and Olson, 1993). Accord-
ing to Gartner (Gartner, 1985), the points of strength
and weakness of a new venture are at the beginning
those of its founder. It is consequently quite obvious
that the probability of f rm success depends strongly
on founder’s competencies and abilities (Holmes
and Schmitz, 1990). The high heterogeneity among
start-ups is mainly due to different entrepreneur ap-
proaches in exploiting same business opportunities.
Very intriguingly Baron and Hanna (2002) found from
a 200 start-up survey in Silicon Valley that “founders
embraced very different mental models of the ideal
organizational form” (p. 9).
Cast under this light, f rm founder characteristics are
critical to assess what capabilities they brought inside
their company, what incentives they had, what busi-
ness idea they f tted in the organisation and how they
shaped the f rm in the initial stages. Blanchower and
Oswald (1998) recognise in the presence of a valu-
able type of information or capability the key element
in the nature of an entrepreneur. This means owning
f rst information regarding the creation and evaluation
of a business opportunity, and then information linked
with the capability to exploit the business opportunity
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In other words, in
order to exploit an opportunity, an entrepreneur should
possess information about specif c aspects of produc-
tion and about user needs (Hippel von, 1988). While
the latter refers to the ability to tailor business ideas
towards possible specif c customers (f nd or build a
market), the former is properly linked to the typology
of the entrepreneur. At this regard, there are three main
entrepreneurial typologies: the innovator, who creates
new products; the arbitrageur, who exploits market
ineff ciencies and the coordinator, who introduces an
19 Note that this industry at 2000 could count only on 11 years
of life.
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alternative use of resources (Bhide, 2000; Shane and
Venkataraman, 2000).
In Table 6, the founder’s origins of the 15 largest
start-ups were listed. The more evident regularity
is that more of 50% of top start-up founders were
employees of a large ICT f rms (53%). The re-
maining 35% were former government or university
researchers and last, 12% were former founders or
employees of other software start-ups. Successful f rm
founders have gained some advantages while working
for large ICT f rms or government-academic institu-
tions. In fact, these two organisations represented the
producers of the basic technology of the sector (see
Table 1) and the main users of these products (see
Table 2).
As a matter of fact, we could suppose that these en-
trepreneurs could have been subject to some learning
processes about the basic technologies (how to inno-
vate) and user’s needs (how to exploit). According to
this view, Klepper and Sleeper (2000) introduced the
term of “heredity” that spin-offs received from the par-
Table 6
Founders of top 15 start-ups and their origins
Firm Founder Patent assignee Former founder’s employer
Large Firms
Certicom P. Panjwani  Motorola
Cylink L. Morris Xerox
Entrust Tech. B. O’Higgins  Nortel
Network Ass. W. Larson  Apple and Sun Microsystem
Network Ass. J. McAfee  Lockheed Martin
Rainbow Tech. W. Straub GTE and Compaq
RSA Data Security C. Stuckey IBM
RSA Data Security R. Rivest  MIT, Pitney Bowes
Safenet A. Caputo  Computer Ass.
Secure Comp. K. Beseke  Honeywell and Motorola
Trend Micro S. Chang  H&P
Small f rms
BindView Dev. E.J. Pulaski Network Research, systems integrator
SystemSoft R. Angelo Phoenix Technologies, a software producer
VeriSign J. Bidzos RSA Data Security
University and Public Research Laboratories
Certicom S. Vanstone  University of Waterloo
Aladdin Y. Margalyt  Hebrew University
CheckPoint Software G. Shwed  Optrotech, Israel Defence Forces
CheckPoint Software M. Nacht Optrotech, Israel Defence Forces
Rainbow Tech. A. Jennings  Mathematician
Safenet A. Hastings  National Security Agency
Symatenc G. Hendrix Stanford University
Source Hoover’s and US Patent Off ce.
ent f rm especially when there is some knowledge em-
bedded in human capital. For example, in the automo-
bile industry, Klepper (2001) highlights how spin-offs
from incumbents f rms have a high probability of sur-
viving and growth.
It is interesting that among the 18 entrepreneurs
coming from ICT incumbents and universities, 72%
are assigned at least one patent at USPTO (Table 6).
In this sense, their fundamental entrepreneurial com-
petence was the ability to exploit mathematical
skills linked to the ability of software compiling
and design. Moreover, it is worth noting that among
these founders-inventors, 61% were also assigned
a patent before starting their company, when em-
ployed in a R&D laboratory of a large ICT f rm or
university.
Firm founders in ESI are typically innovators, be-
cause it is an innovation that has pushed them to set
up a new venture.
In Box 3, we collect some useful cases to support
this hypothesis.
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Box 3. Firm founder origins
• B. O’Higgins, the founder of Entrust, has
overall responsibility for the technology vi-
sion and direction for the company. He was
previously with Nortel where he established
the Secure Networks group in 1993 and
with BNR-Bell Northern Research, which he
joined in 1979. At BNR, he was involved
with a variety of technology development
programs, including public key security sys-
tems, technology for new telephone products,
in-building wireless communications systems
and high performance computing architectures
for call processing applications.20
• A. Vanstone, the founder of Certicom, was
a professor of Mathematics, and he has pub-
lished more than 150 research papers and
several books on topics such as cryptography,
coding theory, f nite geometry, and combina-
torial designs.21
• Prior to launching Trend Micro, S. Chang
worked as an engineer in the R&D labora-
tories of Hewlett-Packard. He received his
B.S. in Applied Mathematics and his M.S.
in Computer Science. He founded Trend Mi-
cro in 1988 with the mission of developing
anti-virus software for personal computers,
with a company’s focus to address total
network security.22
To conclude this section, the link between inno-
vation and new f rm formation was the major issue
presented, where innovation was the key to open
new market niches, avoiding potential entry barriers.
Then, entrepreneur characteristics were fundamental
to understand start-up performance especially dur-
ing its f rst years, because ESI was a classical case
study where inventors become entrepreneurs. We then
stressed the importance of patents as a tool to defend
20 “Network Magazine Names Entrust/PKI(TM) Software 2001
Product of the Year”, Market News Publishing, 8 June 2001, p. 34.
21 “Certicom’s Founder Receives Security Award for Mathemat-
ics from RSA”, Market News Publishing, 11 June 2001, p. 100.
22 “Behind-the-scenes attack on the virus plague. Steve Chang,
Founder of Trend Micro”, The Financial Times, 7 June 2000, p. 8.
f rm knowledge assets, an aspect quite remarkable in
the software industry. In ESI, patents helped to build
a market for technology that was essential in shaping
competitive outcomes. This is also highlighted by
the presence of two separated markets for software
products and mathematical algorithms.
4. The drivers of start-up growth
In the previous sections we have highlighted the
main factors beyond f rm entry, while here we draw
attention on the f rm growth process.
Firms survived from f rst competitive shocks faced
new challenges. Empirical studies (Audretsch, 1991;
Geroski, 1995; Klepper, 1996) have found how size
and age positively affect the capacity of surviving of
new entrants. In the case of ESI, Table 2 shows that top
15 start-ups have different entry times (see Table 2)
and Fig. 1 that f rst mover advantage effects are in-
signif cant. Therefore, f rm age does not seem a pow-
erful discerning variable.
On the other hand, clearly size, growth and survival
are strictly correlated. The research challenge of this
section relies in disentangling the drivers of start-up
growth in an industry where scale economies and sunk
costs are negligible.
The more the time a f rm is able to remain on the
market, the more is the number of requirements, infor-
mation and feedbacks that it should elaborate. In fact,
some scholars (Pavitt, 1988; Dodge et al., 1994) have
noted that young f rm evolution is linked with the f rm
capacity to deal with an increasing level of complex-
ity. Especially in ESI, from an initial phase mainly
based on technological advantages, the competition
moved towards a multifaceted dimension. Most of the
ESI start-ups experienced that being technologically
at the frontier was not a lasting suff cient condition
to growth. Following the entrepreneurship literature
(see for example Vinnell and Hamilton, 1999), we
highlight below two main issues that are conven-
tional in explaining young f rm growth. These factors
are: (i) product differentiation; and (ii) international
expansion linked with investments in co-specialised
assets. In analysing them, we remind that the in-
teractions between these factors and f rm size are
correlated and not linear (for example, the more a
f rm offers a broad range of products, the more it ac-
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cesses to new international markets, the larger will be
its size).
4.1. Product differentiation
Product differentiation is one of the main channels
that strengthen f rm competitive advantages. Firms
selling a broad range of products are in a better posi-
tion to gain high margins, to increase their costumer
base, to process and screen more information about
market trends. Two main orders of motivations sustain
the f rm broadening of product variety: demand side
factors and f rm strategic factors (Lancaster, 1990).
Tailoring products on customer preferences with
product differentiation favours the reduction of sales
uncertainty and the achievement of higher market
shares. Along this view, empirical works have con-
f rmed a positive relationship between market share
and product line breadth (Kekre and Srinivasan,
1990). For example, in a study on the computer work-
station industry, Soreson (2000) has recently found
that product variety strongly affects the probability of
a f rm’s survival.
The second type of factors refers to the strategic
utilisation of product differentiation against potential
competitors. Firms could offer a broad product vari-
ety as a strategic barrier to pre-empt new specialised
markets entrants, especially when scale economies
are modest. Lancaster (1990) studied product variety
as a tool to saturate the product space in order to de-
ter entry. This is an essential point to understand how
product differentiation could affect f rm performances
in software industry. We will see that when scale
economies do not play a major role as in ESI, the
range of product portfolio becomes one of the most
critical variables to obtain and defend a competitive
advantage.
Looking at product data on a time scale dimen-
sion, Table 7 shows the number of different versions
of products in each niche in two sub-periods. There is
evidence of an increasing product proliferation, linked
with the rise of the software packages tailored to net-
work design and security.
Fig. 3 shows that ESI evolution is characterised by
two trends: as the ratio between products and f rms
increases (less f rms, more products) the average f rm
diversif cation increases, and otherwise. It seems that
waves of specialised entrants, that increase the level
Table 7
New products by market niche in ESI, 1989–95 and 1996–2000
Description Number of products in years
1989–1995 1996–2000
Authentication-Digital Signature 26 39
Anti-virus 21 11
Data storage protection 104 207
Firewalls 7 89
Utility software 15 22
Network Software Security 39 340
Virtual private network 0 242
Other 23 83
Total 235 1033
Concentration index
Herf ndhal 0.253 0.214
C2 0.608 0.529
Source Infotrac.
of average f rm product specialisation, are followed
by periods of market consolidation where specialised
f rms leave the market, and companies with a broader
product variety survive.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the average
Herf ndahl index calculated on the product portfolio
of the survived f rms at 2000 equals to 0.741, while
the Herf dahl index for out-gone f rms is 0.924 (the
two values are statistical different, T -test = 8.793).
Introducing f rm age, the Herf ndahl index for the
87 exit f rms that survived at least 4 years is equal
to 0.867, while for the survived f rms by 2000 with
more than 4 years of life is 0.694 (T -Test = 13.715).
The average Herf ndahl is computed across differ-
ent product niches according to Table 3. Using the
total sample, Pearson correlation coeff cient between
f rm duration on the market and f rm level of product
differentiation (Herdindahl index) equals −0.71, with
a signif cance level of 5%.
Herf ndahl index for the top 15 start-ups (see
Table 2) equals to 0.265 for the period 1989–1995
and 0.174 for the period 1996–2000, highlighting
an increasing product differentiation of the market
leaders. Data seem to conf rm that out-gone f rms re-
mained product specialised, while f rms that survived
adopted product differentiation.
If in ESI competing with a broad product selection
is considerably correlated with f rm survival capabili-
ties, it will be extremely interesting to understand how
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Fig. 3. Number of products standardised by number of f rms compared to average f rm diversif cation index, 1989–2000.
a f rm, born specialised in a particular niche, could
have succeeded in expanding its product range. We
would like to stress that every f rm entered in ESI
was specialised in a particular product niche and there
is not a case of a f rm that entered with a diversify
product portfolio. In this context, alliances and merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) are important sources of
knowledge and resources, especially for young small
f rms (see Stuart et al., 1999; Baum et al., 2000). We
analyse these two aspects in the next paragraphs.
4.1.1. Technological alliances
The in-house development of new products is based
on the exploitation of economies of scope from the
f rm knowledge resources (Teece, 1986). As a matter
of fact, young f rms often do not own all the tech-
nical competencies needed to develop new products.
Recently f rms have exploited technological alliances
as useful tools to quickly learn new technological
competencies and exploiting research synergies. Em-
pirical works on technological alliances reached the
conclusions that collaborative ventures are useful to
determine the product innovativeness especially for
small f rms (Kotabe and Swan, 1995). Stuart et al.
(1999) found that alliances generate positive effects on
young companies beyond other f rm characteristics,
especially with large incumbent partners. Sakakibara
(Sakakibara, 1997) showed that alliances are more
productive if partners have complementary technolog-
ical skills. Empirical works have already established
that the mechanisms sustaining f rm growth in net-
works are highly correlated with the internal growth
ones (Riccaboni and Pammolli, 2001). The impor-
tance of technological alliances should be correlated
with the high technological core of ESI product, as
discussed in great length in previous sections. In this
sense they represent a valuable proxy of f rm R&D
strategies in the context of product development (see
for example Anand and Khanna, 2000). From the
EVENT database, during the period 1993–1999 we
collect 256 collaborative ventures in ESI with the aim
Table 8
Top f rms for number of technological alliances in ESI, 1993–1999
Rank Firm Alliances
(a)
a/Sales
(US$ mil.)
1 RSA Data Security 39 0.406
2 Microsoft 27 0.002
3 Check Point Soft. 19 0.273
4 Network Ass. 18 0.053
5 VeriSign 17 0.167
6 H&P 14 0.000
7 Time Warner 13 0.005
8 Internet Security 12 0.230
9 IBM 12 0.000
10 Entrust Tech. 11 0.235
Sample average 5.877 0.099
Sample S.D. 7.107 0.272
Source EVENT database.
M.S. Giarratana / Research Policy 33 (2004) 787–806 801
Fig. 4. Network of technological alliances, top ESI start-ups and incumbents by sector specialisation, 1993–1999.
of conducting R&D projects. The number of differ-
ent f rms involved is 273.23 In Table 8, the f rms are
ranked according to their number of R&D ventures.
Table 8 shows that the more active f rms are the
leading start-ups and large ICT f rms. This evidence
highlights how the fastest growing start-ups used in-
tensively technological alliances during the sample pe-
riod.
It is worth noticing that only in 43 out of 256 tech-
nological alliances partners have the same core niche
specialisation. Moreover, taking the sample of 15 top
start-ups, in 81% of cases an alliance with a techno-
logical complementary partner was antecedent to the
f rm product introduction in that specif c new niche.
This evidence is conf rmed by Fig. 4, a network graph
on technological alliances among the f rms with the
highest number of alliances, grouping them according
to their initial niche specialisation.
Fig. 4 shows that the 15 top f rms in ESI that en-
ter specialised in a particular niche set up techno-
logical linkages with small f rm specialised in other
23 Note that the partners of an alliance could be more than two.
niches of ESI and with large ICT f rms. This seems to
conf rm that technological complementarities are im-
portant factors at work. The high propensity to con-
clude alliances among technologically complementary
start-ups supports the hypothesis that technological
alliances are means to quickly absorb non-core f rm
competencies, expanding f rm product variety. And
this is beyond the classical alliance benef ts as a type
of endorsement (see Stuart et al., 1999). Interviews
with managers of some start-ups conf rmed that re-
search consortia and technological co-operations were
indispensable to f rm growth and product differentia-
tion. For example, Checkpoint found in 1997 OPSEC
a research consortium with the aim of providing users
with an integrated Internet security solution. OPSEC
is formed now by more than 350 partners, including
f rms like IBM, Microsoft, Cisco and Siemens.24
However, being an important actor in a technologi-
cal network should be connected with the f rm ability
to be a strong potential technological partner. Firms
that have the high participation intensity in technology
24 See http://www.opsec.com.
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networks have also a sound technological base. Some
statistics supports these conjectures: in the EVENT
database, among all the f rms that set up at least one
technological alliance, only 27% owns a patent in the
380 USPTO class. But this 27% of f rms accounts for
more than 54% of technological alliances. External
learning is also a function of the in-house effort in
R&D (see for example Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).
4.1.2. Merger and acquisitions
During the period 1993–1999, 82 acquisitions have
been completed in ESI. In EVENT database we clas-
sif ed the f rms involved for their active (buyer) or
passive (acquired) role. The acquirer f rms are 52 in
our sample25. The f rms with the highest number of
acquisitions are Network Associates (5 acquisitions),
Axent Technology (4) and RSA Data Security (4). In
Box 4, we brief y analyse the acquisition strategy of
these three f rms.
The acquisition course of action of these three f rms
is clearly directed to acquire market shares in new
product niches. This trend well represents the strategy
in the whole industry. In 77% of acquisitions part-
ners involved (acquired and buyer) had different prod-
uct niche specialisation, and in 96% the acquired f rm
was less diversify then the buyer. Evidence seems to
conf rm that the criterion that led small f rm acquisi-
tion strategies was to saturate all the market niches in
ESI.
4.2. Downstream capabilities and geographic
expansion
Investments in co-specialised assets, like service ef-
forts and marketing capabilities are an important mean
of appropriation of R&D returns. Building a sound net-
work of downstream channels and distributors implies
a better exploitation of f rm technological resources
(Teece, 1986). Also downstream control could lower
the rate of possible imitation and act as a barrier to
potential entrants. As Teece noted: “A competitive ad-
vantage can be gained or lost on the market of com-
plementary assets” (Teece, 1986, p. 289).
25 In most acquisitions the buyer was an ESI start-up, and only
in three cases out of 82, the buyer was an incumbent from other
sectors. These data show that the M&A dynamics were phenomena
that occurred inside the groups of start-ups in ESI.
Box 4. Mergers and acquisitions in ESI
• In the 1996 Network Associates, which was
specialised in the network access design, ac-
quired McAfee, an anti-virus and utility soft-
ware f rms. A year later, it acquired Pretty
Good Privacy, one of the leading technolog-
ical f rms in the data protection area and in
1998 Trusted Information Systems, a Firewall
maker.
• RSA Data Security, a data protection special-
ist, merged in 1996 with Security Dynamics,
a f rm operating in the authentication and dig-
ital signatures niche. In 1997 RSA acquired
Intrusion Detection, a network software secu-
rity maker, and in 1998 Dynasoft, a f rm spe-
cialised in Unix-security networks.
• In 1997, Axent Technology took control of
Raptor Systems, one of the most important
owner of patents in Firewall technology; in
1998, it acquired Security Network Consult-
ing, a general network design security expert,
and in 1999, PassGo Technologies, a storage
data protector.
We proxy investments in downstream assets with
the number of commercial alliances set up by f rms
(as in Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998).
In EVENT database, we registered 296 commercial
strategic alliances signed in encryption software sec-
tor between 1993 and 1999. These alliances have plain
distribution and marketing aims. Table 9 lists the top
f rms for number of commercial alliances. It is pos-
sible to note that this sample is characterised by top
ESI start-ups (Check Point, Axent, etc.) and large ICT
f rms (IBM, H&P, etc.). It is evident that top start-ups
are the major investors in downstream assets.
The building of these downstream capabilities is di-
rectly linked to a f rm’s capacity to open new geo-
graphic markets where it can establish its presence.
The positive outcomes of this dual strategy are several,
such as sales and prof t expansion, entry and growth
in new product niches, better screening of market op-
portunities and direct contact with a larger customer
base.
The literature has pointed that internationalisation
tends to be easier among f rms with high intensity of
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Table 9
Top f rms for number of commercial alliances in ESI, 1993–1999
Rank Firm Alliances
(a)
a/Sales
(US$ million)
1 Network Ass. 28 0.083
2 RSA Data Security 22 0.229
3 Axent Tech. 14 0.402
4 VeriSign 13 0.128
5 Computer Ass. 10 0.003
6 Check Point Soft. 10 0.144
7 IBM 10 0.000
8 Time Warner 9 0.003
9 Secure Computing Corp. 8 0.297
10 Microsoft 7 0.001
Sample average 4.411 0.077
Sample S.D. 5.194 0.185
Source Event database.
R&D that offer technological complex products with
a high level of product differentiation. This holds es-
pecially for f rms in which its intangible asset value
is large relative to its market value (Ethier, 1986;
Markusen, 1995).
Moreover, recent studies (Kotha et al., 2001) have
found a positive correlation between intangible assets
of software f rms and propensity to internationalise.
Other scholars (Morck and Yeung, 1992) found evi-
dence that especially for small, young and dynamic
f rms the presence of intangible assets is correlated
with a high degree of internationalisation and high
Fig. 5. Firm number of commercial alliances compared to their geographic expansion (Herf ndahl Index).
“abnormal” stock market returns. This is particularly
true for niche products with general-purpose function-
alities such as the ESI product.
Data show that the main geographic markets for
encryption software products are North America and
Europe; as a matter of fact, according to Hoovers, in
1999 the 66.7% of the revenues in ESI came from
the US market, followed by Europe (16.1%) and Asia
(3.8%). Our alliance data show an important tendency
to f rm internationalisation. In this respect, we assign
to each agreement the country where the alliance in-
vestment is direct. We then calculated for each f rms,
the Herf ndahl index on the commercial alliances by
year and by country. As Fig. 5 shows, when the num-
ber of commercial alliances is rising, the dispersion of
alliances among different countries increases. Firms
in ESI use commercial agreements also to open new
geographical markets. This was extremely important
for f rms in emerging countries like Israel (Aladdin,
CheckPoint) or Ireland (Baltimore) where the dimen-
sion of indigenous markets was small (Arora et al.,
2001). Managers at Baltimore and Checkpoint agree
in stressing the importance of f rm internationalisation
strategies: “It was strategically prof table in the long
run that we do not focus on our local customers from
the beginnings”.
In order to summarise this section, we have seen
that product differentiation was central for start-ups
in order to gain competitive advantages when scale
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economies are small. Moreover, investments in
co-specialised assets, especially aimed to the f rm ge-
ographic expansion, are necessary to sustain growth
of young f rms. At this regards, alliances appear as
good tools to study small f rm behaviour.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the birth of a new market
niche in the software industry. We depicted the differ-
ent phases of competition and the strategic responses
of main actors, focusing on the process of entry by
start-ups and post-entry f rm strategies.
We have shown that a sound technological base, a
broad product variety and structured co-specialised as-
sets are variables strongly correlated to start-up prob-
ability to survive and grow.
In detail, we illustrated the strict link between in-
novation and new f rm formation, where innovation
was the key to open new market niches, avoiding en-
try barriers and discovering new potential customers.
Following this point, entrepreneur characteristics were
fundamental to understand start-up performance espe-
cially during its f rst years. ESI in fact was a classical
case study where inventors become entrepreneurs ex-
ploiting their technological knowledge.
We then stressed the importance of patents as a tool
to defend f rm knowledge assets. This is quite unusual
in the software industry, where f rms do not exten-
sively protect their innovation by means of patents.
But in ESI, patents helped to build a market for tech-
nology that was essential in shaping competitive out-
comes. This is also highlighted by the presence of two
separated markets for software products and mathe-
matical algorithms.
We saw that if technology was crucial in determin-
ing the positive result of f rm entry, exploitation of
economies of scope direct to product differentiation
and investments in downstream assets linked with f rm
geographic expansion represented the key to under-
stand f rm growth when scale economies are small.
At this regards, alliances appear as essential tools to
achieve these results for small f rms that usually rely
on scarce resources.
Sound evidence conf rmed the importance of small
f rms in opening new markets where large incumbents,
for several reasons, have low incentives to invest. On
the other side, we highlighted how large established
f rms acted as incubators of technological competen-
cies embedded in the future entrepreneurs, and also as
important actors both in the technological and com-
mercial networks in ESI.
This paper leaves some points of discussion open.
The relationship between f rm initial capabilities and
the patterns of f rm growth is still in need to be deeper
studied.
In ESI, the coexistence of good initial capabilities
and optimal growth strategies determinate the suc-
cess of a start-up. But causes and consequences of
a f rm’s success do still not have a clear-cut role. In
future works it will be interesting to investigate if: (i)
initial f rm competencies embedded in entrepreneurs;
and (ii) f rm strategies direct towards product dif-
ferentiation and geographical expansion are the two
faces of the same mechanism, or, otherwise, whether
f rm strategies produce an effect beyond f rm-founder
initial capabilities.
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